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Financing Local Government in the
Post-Proposition 13 Era: The Use and
Effectiveness of Nontaxing Revenue
Sources
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, California voters approved initiative Proposition 13,
amending the California Constitution.1 Prior to Proposition 13,
property taxes were the main source of revenue for local
governments,2 including cities, counties, and special districts.3
1. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA §§ 1-6 (West Supp. 1991). Proposition 13 was placed on the June
1978 primary ballot through the initiative process. See CAL. CONST. art. II §§ 8, 10 (West 1983)
(constitutional provisions for the state initiative process); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3500-3524,3530-3579
(West 1977 & Supp. 1991) (statutes governing initiatives, excluding initiatives proposed by the
legislature). Proposition 13 has been amended several times since 1978. References in this Comment
are to the current amended text unless otherwise indicated. See infra notes 26-47 and accompanying
text (discussing the relevant provisions of Proposition 13).
2. In 1977, one year before Proposition 13 was adopted, property taxes in California
contributed 22.4% of city revenues, 36.3% of county revenues, and 67.4% of nonenterprise special
district revenues. See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF
PROPOSITION 13 ON LocAL GOvERNMENTS 6-10 (Oct. 1979) (prepared by the California Legislative
Analyst pursuant to Cal. S.B. No. 154, 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 292 (1978) and Cal. S.B. 2212, 1978 Cal.
Stat. ch. 332 (1978)) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS]. Other significant sources of state and local
government revenues are, in order of decreasing percentage of contribution: Sales and use taxes,
personal income taxes, and corporate franchise and income taxes. 11 N. LANE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 1 (2d ed. 1987).
3. The following is an overview of the legal structure of local government in California.
Cities and Counties: Cities and counties in California are either general law or chartered. CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA STATE AND LOCAL TAX SYSTEMS: A REVIEW OF
MAJOR REVENUE SouRcEs 245 (July 1985) [hereinafter ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT]. General law
cities and counties are organized under the general laws of the state and must derive their authority
to act from a constitutional grant of authority or from an act of the legislature. Il In contrast,
chartered cities and counties may act without specific statutory authority, subject to constitutional
constraints. a Cities have constitutional authority to adopt a charter while counties may do so only
with approval of the legislature. IL Special Districts: Special districts are autonomous units of local
government which provide governmental services, generally within unincorporated areas. Id. at 246.
Examples of special districts include the following: Water districts, transit districts, waste disposal
districts, and fighting and lighting maintenance districts. IL Each special district's authority is
restricted to those powers and activities specifically provided for in the special district's enabling
statute. Ia at 247. The term *'special district" as used in this Comment refers loosely to all local
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Proposition 13, however, severely curbed the ability of state and
local taxing jurisdictions to raise money by limiting annual levies
on real property to one percent of the 1975-76 assessed value4 and
by restricting the passage of state tax increases.' Although
Proposition 13 permits local taxing authorities to collect revenues
through the use of "special taxes" under section 4 of the
proposition, such taxes require a two-thirds vote of the local
electorate.6 As a result, revenues flowing to local governments
from general property taxes have abruptly diminished.7 Cities,
counties, and special districts which had been dependent on
property taxes to finance municipal improvements, services, and
facilities were thus faced with the prospect of drastically reducing
expenditures or finding new sources of revenue.8
Increasingly, municipalities have responded to the harsh fiscal
effect caused by the taxing restrictions of Proposition 13 by turning
to nontaxing revenue sources not subject to the provisions of the
amendment.9 Specifically, local governments have employed
taxing districts, including school and police and fire protection districts, as well as those districts
created by statute.
4. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA §§ l(a), 2(a) (West Supp. 1991).
5. Ma § 3. Proposition 13 provides for a maximum 2% annual increase of the assessed value
of real property after the 1975-76 base year. Id § 2(b). Further, any changes in the state taxing
scheme must be approved by two-thirds of each of the two houses of the legislature, except that no
new ad valorem taxes on real property may be imposed. Xa § 3.
6. Id § 4. No definition of the term "'special tax" appears in section 4. However, the
California Supreme Court has construed this term to mean taxes "levied for a specific purpose rather
than ... a levy placed in the general fund to be utilized for general governmental purposes." City
and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 57, 648 P.2d 935, 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713,
718 (1982). See infra notes 102-113 and accompanying text (discussing the Farrell decision).
7. See LoisLATvE ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing the loss of property tax
revenues effected by Proposition 13). Property tax revenues dropped 51% one year after the
enactment of Proposition 13, a $5.9 billion decrease from revenues in the previous fiscal year. Ia
8. T. SCHWADRON & P. RrcHTmz, CALFORNmA AND THE Am cAN TAX REVOLT 70-79
(1984). Examples of how local governments have reacted to Proposition 13 include curtailed local
services, deferred facility maintenance, layoffs, and increased user fees. AssEMBLY RESEARCH
REPORT, supra note 3, at 239.
9. Henke, The Effect of Proposition 13 Court Decisions on California Local Government
Revenue Sources, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 251,281-90 (1988); Lefcoe & Allison, The Legal Aspects of
Proposition 13: The Amador Valley Case, 53 S. CAL. L REV. 173, 190-91 (1979). See Kroll,
California Cities v. Prop. 13, 3 CAL LAW., Jun. 1983, at 28, 30 (stating that "cities and counties are
beating the bushes for new taxes, fees and assessments" and "are developing creative ways of
financing local government").
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special benefit assessments 0 and governmental regulatory and
service fees" to ease their financial burdens.12 However, the use
of these nontaxing alternatives has been challenged in recent years
as circumventing the purposes of Proposition 13.1
3
Part I of this Comment surveys the background, relevant
provisions, and fiscal impact of Proposition 13.14 Part II examines
court decisions interpreting Proposition 13 which have impacted the
ability of local governments to raise revenues for municipal
improvements, services, and facilities.15 Part I1 analyzes the use
and effectiveness of special benefit assessments and governmental
regulatory and service fees to avoid the taxing restrictions of
Proposition 13 and recoup lost revenues. 16 Part IV considers the
current status and future of Proposition 13 and summarizes the role
of California courts in shaping the amendment.17 This Comment
concludes that California courts have tempered the effect of
Proposition 13's taxing restrictions by allowing local governments
to develop nontaxing sources of revenue. I"
10. A special assessment is a charge imposed on particular real property for a local public
improvement of direct benefit to that property. Spring Street Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal.
24, 29, 148 P. 217, 219 (1915). See infra notes 122-180 and accompanying text (discussing special
assessments).
11. Governmental fees are charges exacted by local taxing authorities for regulatory activities
or municipal services. Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 660-61, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674,
676-77 (1980). See infra notes 181-233 and accompanying text (discussing governmental fees).
12. Kroll, supra note 9, at 30. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON GOV'T REFORM, FINAL REPORT
118 (Jan. 1979) (listing numerous new or increased county permit, service, and license fees in the
year following the enactment of Proposition 13). See generally AiNUAL REPORTS OF THE STATE
CONTROLLER, FINANCiAL TRANSACTIONS CONcERNING SPECIAL DIsRIucTs (1980) (documenting
175% increase in special assessments levied between 1978 and 1980).
13. Kroll, supra note 9, at 31. See, e.g., City of Sacramento v. Drew, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1287,
1294, 255 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1989) (school construction special assessment struck down); Bixel
Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1208, 1220, 265 Cal. Rptr. 347, 355 (1989) (fire
hydrant fee struck down); Beaumont Investors v. Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water Dist., 165 Cal. App.
3d 227, 238, 211 Cal. Rptr. 567, 573 (1985) (water facilities fee struck down).
14. See infra notes 19-63 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 64-119 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 120-233 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 234-53 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 254-260 and accompanying text.
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I. PROPOSITION 13
A. Historical Background and Purposes
Prior to the enactment of Proposition 13, local property taxes
in California were among the highest in the nation. 9 The adoption
of Proposition 13 was the culmination of a long-standing protest by
California landowners against burdensome property taxes,20 and
the. event was widely characterized as a "taxpayer's revolt.
' 21
The "Jarvis-Garn Initiative "' was intended by its authors to
provide effective property tax relief and, as a corollary, reduce
governmental waste and spending.' Moreover, since California
had a tax surplus which the legislature refused to spend or rebate
to taxpayers, high property taxes seemed unnecessary.24 By
19. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsUs, GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1976-77, at 64, table 25
(1978) (documenting amount of per capita property taxes collected according to state). In the year
preceding Proposition 13, only Alaska, Massachusetts, and New Jersey had higher per capita property
taxes than California. Id.
20. Proposition 13 was the third attempt in 10 years to limit state and local government taxing
power. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY REVENUE & TAXATION COMM., FACTS ABOUT PROPOSITION 13, THE
JARvIs/GANN INImirlvE 7 (1978). In 1968, Proposition 9, which proposed a 1% limit on the
property tax rate, was defeated. la In 1972, Proposition 14, which would have limited the tax rate
from 1.75% to 2%, was also defeated. Ad Proposition 13 received 4,280,689 "yes" votes (64.8%)
to 2,326,167 "no" votes (35.2%). CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 39 (1978).
21. Henke, supra note 9, at 251.
22. Proposition 13 is often called the 'Jarvis-Gann Initiative" after the names of its outspoken
authors: Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann.
23. Henke, supra note 9, at 260. Proponents of Proposition 13 argued in the voters pamphlet,
"'More than 15% of all government spending is wasted! Wasted on huge pensions for politicians
which sometimes approach $80,000 per year! Wasted on limousines for elected officials or taxpayer-
paid junkets. Now we have the opportunity to trade waste for property tax relief." CALIFORNIA
VoTERs PAMPHLET, 56-58, Jun. 6, 1978 (compiled by Cal. Secretary of State) (comments by H.
Jarvis, Chairman, United Organization of Taxpayers and P. Gann, President, Peoples Advocate). A
later Gann initiative, Proposition 4, which passed in 1979, directly addressed governmental spending.
See CAL. CoNsT. art. XIIIB §§ 1-12 (West Supp. 1991), for full text of Proposition 4. Proposition
4 limits the amount of revenue which state and local governments may spend by imposing a ceiling
on most appropriations. ld. § 1. The proposition provides that such appropriations may only increase
consistently with increases in population and the consumer price index. Id
24. Comment, Police and Fire Service Special Assessments Under Proposition 13, 16 U.S.F.
L. REV. 781, 784 (1982). In the years preceding Proposition 13, huge state income tax surpluses
accumulated as economic growth and inflation generated revenues far in excess of budget estimates.
Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 9, at 176. The State Legislature failed to spend or refund the excess
income tax dollars collected and, only after Proposition 13 was enacted, did the Legislature finally
pass a form of inflation indexing designed to reduce the surplus. ld.
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approving Proposition 13, California voters greatly checked the
taxing powers of their state and local governments.2
5
B. Summary of Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Proposition 13 provides a new scheme 26 for taxing real
property and applies to all residential and commercial land uses.'
Prior to the amendment, local governments generally had the power
to impose any taxes and fees, within constitutional or legislative
limits,28  by a vote of their governing bodies.29  However,
Proposition 13 significantly curtailed the independent taxing
authority of local jurisdictions.3" The provisions that have
restricted the ability of local governments to raise revenues are
outlined briefly below.
Section 1 of Proposition 13 limits ad valorem taxes3' on real
property to one percent of the assessed value of such property.
32
Section 2 restricts inflationary increases in the assessed value of
real property, or "full cash value base," 33 to two percent per
year.34 This section further rolled back the full cash value base of
real property to the 1975-76 county assessor's valuation, subject to
25. In 1977-78, the year prior to Proposition 13, California local property taxes were 51%
above the national norm (norm is the average per $1000 of personal income for residents). SECuRrrY
PACIFIC NAT'L BANK, TAXES AND OTHER REVENuE OF STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
CAL ORIA A4-A6 (1982) [hereinafter SECuRRIy PACIFIC STuDY]. One year after Proposition 13,
local property taxes in California were 27% below the national norm. Id.
26. See CAt. REV. AND TAX. CODE §§ 50-100.5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991) (statutes
implementing Proposition 13).
27. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 1(a) (West Supp. 1991).
28. See CAL. CONST. art. XI § 7 (West Supp. 1991) (homerule taxing authority provision for
counties and cities); CAL. CONsT. art. XIII § 37 (repealed provision authorizing state legislature to
vest taxing authority in local governments); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25202 (West 1988) (statute
authorizing counties to levy property taxes); id. § 37100-37101 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) (statutes
authorizing cities to pass ordinances and levy license, sales, and use taxes).
29. LANE, supra note 2, § 4 (2d. ed. Supp. 1990) (citing CAL. CoNsT. art. XI § 5).
30. Id
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1991). An ad valorem tax is one based on the
value of property.
32. CAL CONST. art XIIIA § 1(a) (West Supp. 1991).
33. The "'full cash value base" of real property is the assessed value of such property. Id §
2(a).
34. Id. § 2(b).
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various adjustments."5  While these two sections maintain
proportion between property taxes and property values,36 their
effect was to severely reduce the traditional primary source of
discretionary tax revenue available to local governments.37
Section 3 of Proposition 13 provides that "any changes in State
taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues" require a
two-thirds vote of all members of both the assembly and the
senate.38 Local governments are directly affected by this restraint
on the state legislature since many local governing bodies derive
their taxing authority from enabling statutes.3 9 Section 3 also
expressly prohibits the legislature from imposing any new ad
valorem taxes on real property or new taxes on the sales of real
property.4" This provision is significant since even a nonproperty
tax which receives the requisite supermajority legislative approval
may be struck down if it too closely resembles an ad valorem
tax.
41
Section 4 is a key provision in Proposition 13 since it
compounds the fiscal crisis caused by the amendment's one percent
35. Id § 2(a).
36. One of the concerns leading to the enactment of Proposition 13 was the rapid increase of
property values in California. County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 980, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 777, 780 (1979). However, the increased income of the property owners did not offset the
increased property taxes. Id. Sections 1 and 2 prevent property taxes from rising so high that owners
are forced to sell their property in order to pay the higher assessments. Comment, supra note 24, at
781, 784 n.22 (1982).
37. Henke, supra note 9, at 263. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text (discussing the
fiscal impact of Proposition 13).
38. CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA § 3 (West Supp. 1991).
39. LkNF, supra note 2, § 2. General law cities and counties must derive their authority to tax
from a constitutional grant of authority or from an act of the legislature. ASSEMBLY RESEARCH
REPORT, supra note 3, at 245. Under the California Constitution, counties and cities are authorized
to impose taxes in the exercise of their police power. See CAL. CO NST. art. XI § 7 (West Supp. 1991)
(provision authorizing enactment of local ordinances and regulations for the general public welfare).
All other taxing authority is derived from the state legislature. Nauman, Local Government Taxing
Authority Under Proposition 13, 10 Sw. LJ. 795, 804 (1978). See generally supra note 3 (discussing
the legal structure of local government in California). The legislature may not impose taxes for local
purposes but may authorize local governments to impose them. CAL. CoNST. art. XIII § 24 (West
Supp. 1991).
40. CAL CONST. art. XIIIA § 3.
41. See Henke, supra note 9, at 263.
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ad valorem limitation42 and prohibition of the enactment of new
ad valorem and sales or transaction taxes on real property.43 This
section requires a two-thirds vote of the qualified local electorate
for any new or increased "special tax." 44 A "special tax," as
distinguished from taxes which flow to the local government's
general fund, is one which is earmarked for a specific purpose. 5
Prior to the enactment of section 4, California law generally
permitted any new or increased local taxes without voter
approval.46 The purpose of section 4 is to prevent local taxing
jurisdictions from recouping their losses from decreased property
taxes by imposing or increasing other taxes.47
C. Fiscal Impact
Proposition 13 has been characterized as "the most significant
fiscal act of the people of California in modem times." ' 4 Only
one year following approval of the initiative, property tax revenues
dropped fifty-one percent, a $5.9 billion decrease from property tax
revenues in the prior fiscal year.49 The effect of Proposition 13
upon local governments was debilitating, since property taxes are
the largest single source of tax revenue for cities, counties, and
42. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIA § 1(a) (West Supp. 1991) ("The maximum amount of any ad
valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such
property.").
43. See iU § 3 ("[N]o new ad valorem taxes on real property, or sales or transaction taxes
on the sales of real property may be imposed.").
44. Id §4.
45. City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 57, 648 P.2d 935, 940, 184
Cal. Rptr. 713,718 (1982). See infra notes 102-113 and accompanying text (discussing the California
Supreme Court's interpretation of "special taxes" as used in Proposition 13).
46. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI § 7 (West Supp. 1991) (homerule taxing authority provision
for counties and cities).
47. Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 205-08, 643 P.2d
941, 945-47, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324, 328-30 (1982).
48. CALIFORNIA CoMM'N ON GOV'T REFORM, FINAL REPoRT I (Jan. 1979).
49. LEGISLATivE ANALYsIs, supra note 2, at 3.
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special districts,5" and because all property tax revenues are
devoted to support of local government activities.
51
The California Legislature softened the impact of Proposition
13 by granting financial assistance to local governments.52
Commonly referred to as a "bail-out," 53 the state aid program
replaced some of the lost revenues caused by Proposition 13
through block grants and loans,54 and implemented a method of
distributing the proceeds of the one percent property tax to local
governments.55 However, in the early 1980's the legislature was
forced to reduce financial assistance to local governments because
of the severe recession.5 6  Federal cutbacks and inflation
compounded the cities' and counties' financial problems.57 As a
50. LANE, supra note 2, § 4.
51. i According to the Assembly Office of Research, "the quality of the functions performed
by local jurisdictions has deteriorated." ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at 239.
52. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY REVENUE & TAXATION COMM., SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION
IMPLEWENTING PROPOSrTON 13 FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978-79, S.B. 154 at ii-iii (1978) (discussing the
legislative financial aid plan provided in Senate Bill 154, the short-term program for implementing
Proposition 13).
53. See, e.g., Henke, supra note 9, at 252; Comment, supra note 24, at 788 n.38.
54. For fiscal year 1978-79, the California Legislature allocated $4.2 billion to local
governments and established a $900 million loan fund. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON GOV'T REFORM,
FINAL REPORT 17-19 (Jan. 1979). In fiscal year 1979-80, the "'bail-out" was $4.9 billion, and in
fiscal year 1980-81, the "bail-out" was $5.5 billion. Comment, supra note 24, at 788 n.39. State
financial assistance was based on the surplus generated by the increase in other state taxes. Id. at 787-
88. Although Proposition 13 reduced property tax revenues during 1978-79, the high rate of inflation
that resulted increased other state taxes, including death and gift taxes, state property taxes on motor
vehicles and mobile homes, taxes on corporation net income, and individual income taxes. See
SECURITY PACIFIC STUDY, supra note 25, at A4-A12.
55. ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at 232. Senate Bill 154, the local government
bail-out bill, provided that the countywide proceeds of the 1% property tax collected by local
assessors were to be distributed pro rata to local jurisdictions, based on the average percentage of
annual property taxes revenues collected by the city, county, or district. Id. See generally Doerr, The
California Legislature's Response to Proposition 13,53 S. CAL. L. REV. 77, 77-79 (1979) (discussing
the legislation implementing Proposition 13 and providing for the bail-out program); CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY REVENUE & TAXATION COMM., OVERVIEW OF CURRENT COURT CHALLENGES TO
PROPOSITION 13 AND ITS IMPLE ENTATION LAWS: ASSESSMENT OF SIMILAR PROPERTIES AND
REVENUE ALLOCATION TO LOCAL AGENcIEs 20-25 (Dee. 1989) (discussing the provisions and
underlying policy of legislation implementing Proposition 13).
56. ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at 235-39.
57. Id. at 249-50.
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result, the long-term impact of Proposition 13 is now being felt by
many municipalities."
Because Proposition 13 is not susceptible to legislative
repeal, 59 and since legislative efforts to assist local governments
have been insufficient, 60 cities, counties, and special districts have
been forced to counter property tax revenue losses resulting from
Proposition 13 by developing other sources of revenue, especially
nontaxing levies, for the longer term since the alternative of cutting
expenditures is politically unpalatable." Expectedly, these efforts
to generate revenues through alternative sources have been resisted
as contrary to the provisions of Proposition 13.62 However,
California courts have responded favorably toward local taxing
jurisdictions by restricting the application of Proposition 13.63 It
has been the courts, rather than the legislature, which have taken
an active role in moderating the harsh fiscal impact of Proposition
13, as demonstrated by the decisions discussed below.
IX. RELEVANT PROPOSITION 13 COURT DECISIONS
Since the enactment of Proposition 13, California courts have
examined almost every aspect of the amendment.64 The California
58. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Digre, 205 Cal. App. 3d 99, 102, 252 Cal. Rptr. 99, 99
(1988) (Oakland faced anticipated $14.5 million deficit for fiscal year 1989 because of reduced
federal funding and the long-term impact of reduced property tax revenues); Northgate Partnership
v. City of Sacramento, 202 Cal. Rptr. 15, 17 (1984) (Sacramento faced revenue loss of approximately
$16.6 million in fiscal year 1978-79 as a result of Proposition 13).
59. CAL. CONST. art. II § 10(c) (West Supp. 1991) ("IT]he Legislature may amend or repeal
an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors
unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.").
60. According to the Assembly Office of Research, state fiscal relief since fiscal year 1978-79,
while essential, "helped save a drowning person, but it did not help that person reach shore."
ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPoRT, supra note 3, at 241.
61. See SCHWADRON & RicHTER, supra note 8, at 70-79 (discussing aftermath of Proposition
13 revolt).
62. See infra note 64 (describing cases interpreting the main provisions of Proposition 13).
63. See infra notes 64-119 and accompanying text (discussing relevant Proposition 13 court
decisions).
64. See, e.g., Heckendom v. City of San Marino, 42 Cal. 3d 481,486-89, 723 P.2d 64,67-69,
229 Cal. Rptr. 324, 327-29 (1986) (defining scope of 1% ad valorem tax limit); City and County of
San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 57, 648 P.2d 935, 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1982)
(defining special tax provision); Carman v. Alvord, 31 Cal. 3d 318, 326-33, 644 P.2d 192, 197-201,
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Supreme Court promptly reviewed the constitutionality of
Proposition 13 in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District
v. State Board of Equalization' and upheld the amendment."
The court noted that it was only addressing "those principal,
fundamental challenges to the validity of [Proposition 13] as a
whole." 67 Thus, the interpretation and application of particular
provisions was expressly left for later litigation.68 Since the
Amador decision, most of the litigation surrounding Proposition 13
182 Cal. Rptr. 506, 511-15 (1982) (interpreting bond indebtedness exception to 1% limitation
provision); Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 205-07, 643 P.2d
941,945-47, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324, 328-30 (1982) (interpreting application of two-thirds majority vote
requirement); Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 219, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241, 259 (1978) (deciding
constitutionality of Proposition 13).
65. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978) (decided Sept. 22, 1978, only
3 months after Proposition 13 was adopted).
66. Ia at 219, 248, 583 P.2d at 1283, 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241, 259. The Ainador case
consolidated multiple constitutional challenges to Proposition 13, and the supreme court reached
several holdings. First, the court held that Proposition 13 was a constitutional amendment rather than
an impermissible "revision," and, therefore, an appropriate subject of the initiative process for
amending the California Constitution. Il at 229, 583 P.2d at 1289, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 247. Second,
the court held that Proposition 13 did not violate the single subject requirement of the initiative
process. Id at 232, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250. Third, the court held that Proposition
13 did not deny equal protection of the laws required by the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. Idt at 237, 583 P.2d at 1294-95, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53. Fourth, the court held
that Proposition 13 did not impermissibly infringe upon the right to travel. L at 238, 583 P.2d at
1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253. Fifth, the court held that Proposition 13 did not unconstitutionally impair
contractual rights. Il at 242, 583 P.2d at 1298, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 256. Sixth, the court held that
Proposition 13 did not violate the title and ballot summary requirements for initiatives required by
the California Constitution. l at 243, 583 P.2d at 1298, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 256. Lastly, the court held
that Proposition 13 was not void for vagueness. Ld. at 246, 583 P.2d at 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
67. l at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
68. 1, at 247-48, 583 P.2d at 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 259. Specifically, the supreme court
stated:
[WMe decline to reach the question whether the various interpretations put forth
by the Legislature and State Board of Equalization are correct .... [WMe recently
affirmed that "it seems apparent that we cannot, and should not, attempt to pass
upon the meaning or validity of each contested provision in every hypothetical
context-adjudication of these matters must await an actual controversy, and should
proceed on a case-by-case basis as the need arises."
L at 247, 583 P.2d at 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (citing County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 11 Cal.
3d 662, 674, 522 P.2d 1345, 1352, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345, 352 (1974)).
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has focused on the amendment's one percent ad valorem tax and
special tax limitations,69 which are discussed below.
A. The One Percent Ad Valorem Tax Limit
The scope of the one percent limit on ad valorem real property
taxes in section 1 of Proposition 1370 was addressed by the
California Supreme Court in Heckendorn v. City of San Marino.7
San Marino drafted an ordinance authorizing a special tax which
went into effect after approval by approximately eighty percent of
the city's voters.72 The plaintiff, a city property owner, filed a
complaint alleging that the ordinance, which imposed a graduated
tax based on the size of a real property parcel,73 was an
unconstitutional ad valorem tax.74 However, the court upheld the
ordinance, defining "ad valorem tax" in section 1 of Proposition
13 narrowly as "any source of revenue derived from applying a
property tax rate to the assessed value of property." 75 Under this
definition, the ordinance did not constitute an ad valorem tax since
the ordinance involved no appraisal of property value and taxed
parcels within a zone at the same rate, even if the actual value of
the parcels differed.76 The Heckendorn decision established that
Proposition 13 only prohibits applying a tax rate directly to the
69. While the courts have examined many other aspects of Proposition 13, this Comment only
discusses decisions which have affected local government revenue sources. See generally CALUFORNIA
TAX FOUND., PRoPosITo 13 REPORTER (1985), for a comprehensive compilation of Proposition 13
litigation.
70. CAI. CONST. art. XIIIA § 1(a) (West Supp. 1991).
71. 42 Cal. 3d 481,723 P.2d 64, 229 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1986).
72. Id. at 484, 723 P.2d at 65, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
73. The challenged tax was graduated according to the city's zoning classifications, which
were determined by real property parcel size. Id. at 484, 484-85 n.2, 723 P.2d at 65, 65-66 n.2, 229
Cal. Rptr. at 325, 325-26 n.2. However, within each zone, the ordinances imposed a flat tax rate on
all parcels, despite any variations in size, improvements, and ultimate value. Id at 484-85, 723 P.2d
at 65-66, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 325-26.
74. Id at 485, 723 P.2d at 66, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 326. New ad valorem taxes on real property
are strictly prohibited under Proposition 13. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 4 (West Supp. 1991).
75. Heckendorn, 42 Cal. 3d at 487,723 P.2d at 67,229 Cal. Rptr. at 327 (quoting CAL- REV.
& TAX. CODE § 2202 (West 1987)).
76. Id.
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assessed value of property." Thus, the supreme court seemingly
opened the door to the use of taxes which are closely correlated to
parcel values but not imposed on assessed property values.
78
B. The Special Tax Two-Thirds Vote Requirement
Application of the two-thirds voter majority requirement for
enactment of special taxes under section 4 of Proposition 1371 was
first considered in Los Angeles County Transportation Commission
v. Richmond.8" Two years before the adoption of Proposition 13,
the California Legislature created the Los Angeles County
Transportation Committee (LACTC). t After the initiative was
approved, the LACTC attempted to levy a sales tax for public
transit purposes with only simple majority voter approval.8" The
defendant, LACTC's executive director, refused to implement the
tax, and the LACTC filed a petition for writ of mandate.83 The
California Supreme Court issued an alternative writ, 4 holding that
the LACTC was not a special district within the meaning of section
4,85 and thus was not subject to the two-thirds voter majority
requirement imposed by that section.8"
77. Henke, supra note 9, at 275.
78. Id. For example, using floor area of buildings as well as lot area to define the steps in a
graduated parcel tax presumably would not be precluded by Heckendorn, since no appraisal of
property value is made. Id.
79. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 4.
80. 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982).
81. Id at 199-200, 643 P.2d at 941-42, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25.
82. Id at 200, 643 P.2d at 942, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 325. LACTC's measure authorizing
imposition of the sales tax was approved by 54% of the county voters. Id
83. Id Richmond, the executive director of the LACTC, refused to pay the State Board of
Equalization the administrative costs of collecting the sales tax required by sections 7270 and 7272
of the Revenue & Taxation Code. Id. at 200 n.3, 643 P.2d at 942 n.3, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 325 n.3.
Richmond's refusal to implement the tax was prompted by the California Attorney General's opinion
that the tax ordinance was unconstitutional under section 4 of Proposition 13 because the ordinance
had not received the approval of two-thirds of the voters. Id at 200, 643 P.2d at 942, 182 Cal. Rptr.
at 325 (citing 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 156 (1981)).
84. Id at 200, 643 P.2d at 942-43, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 325-36. The supreme court invoked the
exercise of its original jurisdiction in Richmond "-blecause of the importance of the issues involved
and the need for their prompt resolution." Id
85. Section 4 is applicable specifically to "[eclities, counties and special districts." CAL.
CONsT. art. XIIIA § 4 (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
86. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 207-08, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
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In Richmond, the court concluded that the term "special
district" as used in section 4 of Proposition 13 applies only to
districts authorized to impose ad valorem property taxes." The
majority reasoned that section 4 should apply only to districts
which lost property tax revenues as a result of Proposition 13, since
section 4 was intended to limit the power of local governments to
replace property tax revenue losses.88 Thus, because the LACTC
did not have the power to levy ad valorem taxes, the LACTC was
exempted from the provisions of the amendment. 9
The Richmond decision invited local taxing jurisdictions to
circumvent the restrictions of Proposition 13 by replacing lost
property tax revenues with the use of nonproperty tax special
districts such as the LACTC.9° Justice Richardson's dissent
characterized the majority's ruling as "a hole in the financial fence
which the people in their Constitution have erected around their
government" which would lead to wholesale avoidance of the
purpose of Proposition 13.91 The majority of the court, however,
87. Ia at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328. In Arvin Union School Dist. v. Ross,
176 Cal. App. 3d 189,221 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1985), the Second District Court of Appeal addressed an
issue remaining after Richmond regarding whether the special tax restrictions of section 4 applied to
special districts which were specifically authorized by statute to assess additional property taxes as
needed. Id at 193, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 722. The court held that Proposition 13 preempted the enactment
authorizing collection of additional property taxes and affirmed the rule in Richmond that section 4's
"special districts" language includes all entities empowered to levy on real property. Id. at 199, 221
Cal. Rptr. at 726.
88. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205-06, 643 P.2d at 945-46, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (citing
language in the June 1978 California Voters Pamphlet to support the court's conclusion). See supra
note 23 (quoting comments made by the authors of Proposition 13 and printed in the California
Voters Pamphlet).
89. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205-08, 643 P.2d at 945-47, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328-30. Cf.
Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 38 Cal. 3d 100, 695 P.2d 220,211 Cal. Rptr. 133
(1985). In Huntington Park, the supreme court clarified the Richmond rule, stating that the term
"special districts" as used in section 4 of Proposition 13 encompasses only those agencies which are
empowered to impose and collect property taxes. Id at 105, 695 P.2d at 224, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
Thus, the court held that the plaintiff, a community redevelopment agency which did not have
authority to impose and collect property taxes, was not a special district, even though the agency
received a substantial share of property tax revenues collected by other governmental entities. Id at
105-07, 695 P.2d at 222-24, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 135-37.
90. Henke, supra note 9, at 265-66 n.78.
91. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 213, 643 P.2d at 950, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting). Specifically, Justice Richardson wrote:
The majority has cut a hole in the financial fence which the people in their Constitution have
erected around their government. Governmental entities may be expected, instinctively, to pour
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rejected the argument that its decision in Richmond would result in
such legislative evasion of the restrictions of Proposition 13.'
Indeed, the myriad of nonproperty tax special districts has not
materialized as predicted by the dissent.93
However, Richmond was a harbinger of further erosion of
Proposition 13 in a case decided later the same year, City and
County of San Francisco v. Farrell," which interpreted the term
"special tax" in section 4 of the amendment.95 Although the
Richmond court declined to reach the issue of the meaning of
"special taxes" as used in section 4 and decided the case on the
"special districts" definition issue,' the supreme court did
establish a "framework" for resolving future ambiguities in section
4 of Proposition 1V 7  In Richmond, the court could have
interpreted the term "special districts" broadly98 but declined to
through the opening seeking the creation of similar revenue-generating entities in myriad forms
which will be limited only by their ingenuity.
14
92. Id at 208, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330. The Richmond majority stated, "We
cannot assume that the Legislature will attempt to avoid the goals of article XIIIA by [reorganizing
special districts to remove their property-taxing power or creating new ones without such power]. In
any event, that problem can be dealt with if and when the issue arises." Id
93. Henke, supra note 9, at 267. Henke suggests that nonproperty tax special districts have
not proliferated, partly because of the supreme court's liberal response to the "special tax" issue in
City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47,648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982).
Id.
94. 32 Cal. 3d 47,648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982).
95. See id. at 53-54, 648 P.2d at 937-38, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17 (discussing the Richmond
decision as a precedent for the court's decision in Farrell).
96. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 201-02, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326. While
acknowledging that an ambiguity existed in the meaning of "special taxes" under section 4, the
Richmond court indicated that it was only considering the meaning of the term "special districts."
Id Because the court determined that the LACTC was not a "special district" within the meaning
of section 4, further analysis of section 4 was neither necessary nor appropriate.
97. Id at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328. The Richmond court stated, "The
purpose of our discussion [of the substance and effect of an extraordinary vote requirement] is not
to throw doubt on the constitutionality of the two-thirds vote requirement in section 4, but rather to
establish the framework in which the ambiguity in the language of the provision should be resolved."
Id
98. Id at 202, 643 P.2d at 943-44, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 327. The Richmond court noted that the
term "special district" is generally defined as "a legally constituted governmental entity established
for the purpose of carrying on specific activities within definitely defined boundaries." Id at 202,
643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (citing SENATE FAcT FINmao COMM. REPORT ON REVNUE
AND TAXATIoN, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN CALIFORNIA 177 (Jun. 1965). The
defendant urged the court to interpret "special districts" to mean "any unit of local government
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do so, stating that the language must be strictly construed and the
ambiguities resolved in favor of permitting special districts to enact
special taxes because of the "fundamentally undemocratic nature"
of the supermajority vote requirement contained in section 4."
Thus, for policy reasons, the supreme court departed from the rules
of construction applicable to constitutional initiatives set forth in
Amador,1" and adopted a rule of strict construction for
interpreting section 4 of Proposition 13.101
The California Supreme Court followed the Richmond rule of
strict construction and defined the term "special taxes" as used in
section 4 narrowly in Farrell."° In Farrell, San Francisco had
increased its payroll and gross receipts tax without the approval of
two-thirds of the voters. 0 3 When the mayor approved a request
for funding of municipal improvements to be appropriated from the
gross receipts tax proceeds, Farrell, the city's controller, refused to
allow the appropriation."° The defendant asserted that the
increased gross receipts tax was an unconstitutional special tax
under section 4 of Proposition 13.105 However, the majority
rejected Farrell's argument that section 4 required two-thirds voter
approval for all new and increased nonproperty taxes."° The
supreme court defined "special tax" as used in section 4 as a tax
"levied for a specific purpose rather than.., a levy placed in the
general fund to be utilized for general governmental
other than a city or county that is empowered to levy a 'special tax."' Id at 202, 643 P.2d at 943,
182 CAI. Rptr. at 327.
99. I, at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
100. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 219, 245-246, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 1300-01, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241,
257-58 (1978). The Amador court stated that constitutional initiatives must be "liberally construed'"
and that constitutional provisions and enactment must receive a "practical common-sense
construction" which will meet "changed conditions and the growing needs of the people." I
101. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
102. City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47,56-57,648 P.2d 935,940,184
Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1982).
103. Id at 51,648 P.2d at 936, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 714. The measure in Farrell, which extended
the operation of an ordinance providing for a 0.4% increase in the tax rate, was passed by 55% of
city and county voters. Id at 51, 648 P.2d at 936-37, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
104. Id at 51, 648 P.2d at 937, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
105. Id
106. Id at 57, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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purposes." 1 7 Thus, San Francisco's tax, the proceeds of which
were to be paid in the city's general fund, was not a special tax as
contemplated by Proposition 13 because the tax was not levied for
a specific purpose.0 8
While the supreme court in Farrell could have construed
section 4 to include all nonproperty taxes, t" the court chose the
narrowest application of the section's supermajority vote
requirement.110 Farrell, at least in theory, permits a city to recoup
its lost property tax revenues simply by adopting some other
replacement tax with simple majority vote approval."' Farrell
requires only that the proceeds from the new tax be deposited into
the local government's general fund since proceeds collected for a
specific purpose constitute a special tax requiring supermajority
voter approval.' Although the Farrell result was partially
nullified by the enactment of initiative Proposition 62 in 1986,13
107. Id.
108. ld.
109. Henke, supra note 9, at 267-68. The Farrell court, like the court in Richmond, also had
an opportunity to choose a broad interpretation of the ambiguous provision of Proposition 13 at issue.
32 Cal. 3d at 53-54, 648 P.2d at 938, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 716. If one regards the ad valorem property
tax as the "regular" local tax, then the term "special" in section 4 can be understood to include all
additional nonproperty taxes. Id. at 59, 648 P.2d at 941, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
The defendant had argued that a "special tax" is an "extra, additional, or supplemental charge
imposed... to raise money for public purposes." Id at 53-54, 648 P.2d at 938, 184 Cal. Rptr. at
716.
110. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 57, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The supreme court's
interpretation of the meaning of "special taxes" in Farrell is especially significant in light of an
earlier decision, Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685
(1981). In Trent Meredith, although the Court of Appeal for the Second District did not attempt to
define the meaning of "special taxes" in section 4, the court did express concern that if the term
were defined as taxes collected and earmarked for a special purpose, local governments could easily
avoid Proposition 13 by depositing their nonproperty tax proceeds in the general fund. Ita at 323, 170
Cal. Rptr. at 688. The Farrell majority did not address the court of appeal's concern, which was
echoed in the dissenting opinions to Farrell. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 58, 648 P.2d at 941, 184 Cal.
Rptr. at 719 (Richardson and Kaus, JJ., dissenting).
111. Henke, supra note 9, at 276.
112. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 57, 648 P.2d at 940,184 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
113. See 1986 Cal. Stat. prop. 62, codified at CAI. GOv'T CODE §§ 53720-53730 (West Supp.
1991) (codifying Initiative 62). Proposition 62 requires that a local governmental or district governing
body approve by two-thirds vote the imposition of a general fund tax. Id. § 53722. Although the
proposition also requires electorate approval to levy a general fund tax, only a simple majority is
necessary. I&a § 53723.
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the decision illustrates the supreme court's desire to limit the
application of Proposition 13.
C. Summary
As Heckendorn, Richmond, and Farrell indicate, the California
Supreme Court has construed the provisions of Proposition 13
narrowly and the consequences of these decisions can be summed
briefly. First, Proposition 13 is aimed primarily at controlling ad
valorem property taxes."1 However, the one percent limit on ad
valorem taxes'15 is limited in application, since the California
Supreme Court has narrowly defined "ad valorem" as a tax rate
based solely on the assessed value of property.
116
Second, city and county general revenue taxing powers remain
unaffected by Proposition 13 except that new or increased
nonproperty tax revenues levied for a specific purpose require
approval by two-thirds of the local voters." 7 Of course, a new or
increased nonproperty tax which too closely resembles an ad
valorem tax is precluded by Proposition 13 even if approved by a
supermajority local electorate vote, since Proposition 13 strictly
prohibits such action.'
Thus, although the California Supreme Court initially approved
the constitutionality of all sections of Proposition 13,"' the court
has since been unwilling to read the amendment expansively. This
result is encouraging to local governments. However, local taxing
114. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (discussing the historical background and
purposes of Proposition 13).
115. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 1(a).
116. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Heckendorn decision,
defining "ad valorem tax").
117. See supra notes 79-101 and accompanying text (discussing the Richmond decision,
interpreting the application of the two-thirds voter majority requirement).
118. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictions of section 4).
The California Constitution does permit increases in ad valorem taxes on real property above the 1%
limit to pay interest and redemption charges on indebtedness for the acquisition or improvement of
real property. CAL. CONST. art. XIIA § 1(b).
119. See Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal.
208,219,248,583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239,241,259 (1978) (holding Proposition
13 to be a valid constitutional amendment).
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jurisdictions have received the biggest boost from the courts'
tolerance of bold municipal moves to finance local government
through nontaxing alternatives.
III. THE USE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NONTAXING
ALTERNATIVES TO AVOID PROPOSITION 13
On its face, Proposition 13 applies only to tax revenues, as
opposed to nontax revenues. 0 Thus, an avenue is open to local
taxing jurisdictions to offset the fiscal impact of Proposition 13 on
ad valorem property taxes and special purpose nonproperty taxes
by generating revenues through nontaxing levies. 12' Two specific
types of nontax revenue devices are special benefit assessments and
goVernmental fees, discussed below.
A. Special Benefit Assessments
A special assessment is "a charge imposed on particular real
property for a local public improvement of direct benefit to that
property." 122 An "assessment district" consists of the property
or properties specially assessed to bear the expense of such
improvement.1 3 The theory underlying special assessments is that
the assessed property receives a direct benefit as it increases in
value due to the property's proximity to the local
improvement.2 This benefit to the property or properties within
the district is greater than that received by the general public."n
1 120. See CAL. CoNST. art. XIHA §§ 1-6 (West Supp. 1991) (using term "tax" rather than
another descriptive term such as "levy" or "'assessment").
121. See generally Henke, supra note 9 (discussing the effect of Proposition 13 on existing
local government revenue sources).
122. Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal. App. 3d 545,552, 169
Cal. Rptr. 391, 395 (1980).
123. Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. 3d 839, 848, 750
P.2d 324, 329, 244 Cal. Rptr. 682, 687 (1988) (citing Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 16 Cal.
3d 676, 683, 547 P.2d 1377, 1381, 129 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1976). See generally CAL. STS. & HIoH.
CODE §§ 5000-6794 (West 1969 & Supp. 1991) (Improvement Act of 1911); id §§ 10000-10706
(West 1969 & Supp. 1991) (Municipal Improvement Act of 1913).
124. Solvang, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 553, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
125. Id at 552, 169 Cal. Rptr. 395.
1350
1991 / Financing Local Government in Post-Proposition 13 Era
Therefore, a special assessment is fairly imposed on those
benefitted, since the general public should not have to bear the
expense when the public does not receive a corresponding
benefit. 126
An assessment district is formed by local legislative
resolution; 7 no electorate approval is required.128 The creation
of special assessment districts takes place "as the result of a
peculiarly legislative process," 129  and the authority of local
governing bodies to impose special assessments is grounded in the
taxing power of the sovereign. 3' Although a special assessment
is imposed through the same mechanism used to finance the cost
of a local government, special assessments are distinct from taxes,
which are levied for general revenues and for general public
126. Il The Solvang court stated that -[t]he general public should not be required to pay for
special benefits for the few, and the few specially benefitted should not be subsidized by the general
public." Il
127. Russ Bldg., 44 Cal. 3d at 849, 750 P.2d at 329, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
128. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 1466,269 Cal. Rptr.
147, 159 (1990). In Bolen, the court stated that neither property owners nor nonproperty owners in
a proposed district had a constitutional right to vote on the formation of an assessment district. L
at 1463, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58. However, the court noted that if the right to vote is conferred, the
election must comply with equal protection requirements. Id at 1464,269 Cal. Rptr. at 158. Despite
the lack of a constitutional right to vote on the imposition of an improvement assessment, interested
parties are not completely foreclosed from challenging the proposed assessment. Dawson v. Town
of Los Altos Hills, 16 Cal. 3d 676, 683 n.4, 547 P.2d 1377, 1381 n.4, 129 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 n.4
(1976). The local rulemaking body must afford such parties a hearing at which the parties may
question any aspect of the proposed improvement, assessment, or district. l. A majority of affected
property owners protesting the proposed improvement can generally block the formation of a district,
subject to a four-fifths majority override by the local rulemaking body. l Failure to follow proper
procedure for asserting a challenges to a proposed assessment may preclude later litigation of the
matter. See City of Larkspur v. Main County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist., 168 Cal.
App. 3d 947, 956-58, 214 Cal. Rptr. 689, 695-97 (1985) (town did not object at special hearing,
which was exclusive procedure for asserting lack of benefit).
129. Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 16 Cal. 3d, 676,683,547 P.2d 1377, 1381, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 101 (1976).
130. IL See Bryant v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 111 F.2d 9,14 (9th Cir. 1940) (stating that
a city derives its power to levy and collect special assessments from its power of taxation). See also
CAL. CONST. art. XI § 7 (homerule taxing authority provision for counties and cities). A distinction
should be made between general law cities and counties and charter cities. See supra note 3
(discussing the legal structure of local government in California). Local general law governments may
impose special assessments only if specifically authorized by the state legislature. AssEMIBLY
RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at 247. However, charter cities are authorized to impose special
assessments without legislative approval pursuant to the California Constitution. l.
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improvements."' Hence, as the California Supreme Court has
observed, a special assessment is not a tax at all, but simply a
charge imposed to recoup the cost of a public improvement made
for the special benefit of particular property. 132
Prior to the enactment of Proposition 13, special assessment
legislative acts 3 3 had been the most widely used procedure to
finance construction of a variety of public improvements. 34 The
use of special assessments became even more extensive after
Proposition 13 as local governments sought to offset lost property
tax revenues. 135 The effect of Proposition 13 upon special
assessments was first examined in County of Fresno v.
Malnstrom.136 Fresno County attempted to collect assessments
within a subdivision for the construction of streets. 37 However,
the defendant, the Fresno County Treasurer and Tax Collector,
refused to serve notice of assessment on the property owners,
contending that the assessment in question contravened Proposition
13.138 The Court of Appeal for the Fifth District granted the
131. Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal. App. 3d 545,553,169
Cal. Rptr. 381, 396 (1980). See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 73
Cal. App. 2d 548, 552, 166 P.2d 917, 920 (1946) (enumerating the significant differences between
a special assessment and a tax).
132. Spring Street Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 24, 29, 148 P. 217, 219 (1915). See
Solvang, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 553, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 396 ("a special assessment is not a tax at all,
but a benefit to specific real property financed through the use of public credit"). Property owners
may pay for the special assessments either in cash or, at their option, by installments over a period
of time. County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 978, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1979).
133. See, e.g., CA.. STs. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5000-6794 (West 1969 & Supp. 1991)
(Improvement Act of 1911); id §§ 8500-8851 (West 1969 & Supp. 1991) (Municipal Bond Act of
1915); id §§ 10000-10706 (West 1969 & Supp. 1991) (Municipal Improvement Act of 1913).
134. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 978,156 Cal. Rptr. 779. Examples of public improvements
are, streets, sidewalks, sewers, water systems, and lighting and public utility lines. Id.
135. Comment, supra note 24, at 797. In 1978-79, special assessments amounted to $36
million. Id at 797, n.88. In 1979-80, that amountiumped to $98 million, an increase of almost 175%.
Id
136. 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1979).
137. Id at 977, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79. Assessment proceedings were initiated by the Fresno
County Board of Supervisors pursuant to Streets and Highways Code sections 10000 through 10600,
the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913. Id
138. Id at 977-78, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 779. The defendant's argument that the assessment was
unconstitutional was two-fold. First, the defendant contended that the assessment would result in a
levy which exceeded the 1% limit ofsection 1 of Proposition 13. Id Second, the defendant contended
that the assessment constituted a "special tax" which had not been approved by a two-thirds vote
of qualified electors under section 4 of the amendment. Id
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county's request for a writ of mandate to compel the county tax
collector to serve the notice of assessment, ruling that the
provisions of Proposition 13 did not apply to the assessment.139
The decision in Malmstrom resolved two questions regarding
the continuing viability of special assessments after Proposition
13.140 First, the court held that the one percent limit on ad
valorem taxes did not apply to special assessments because the
purposes of Proposition 13 would not be thereby furthered. 41 The
court reasoned that it would be "illogical" to include special
assessments within section 1, since that section was intended to
control ad valorem taxes and limit wasteful governmental spending
of general tax funds. 142  Second, the court held that special
assessments did not require approval by a supermajority of voters
because special assessments were not a tax per se, and thus not
included in the definition of "special taxes" in section 4.143 The
court stated that while both special assessments and taxes may
specially benefit particular property, a special assessment may not
exceed the benefit conferred, whereas a special tax need not so
specifically benefit the taxed property.'" Malmstrom represents
a significant rein on the effect of Proposition 13, since many public
139. Id at 986, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
140. A later case, County of Placer v. Corin, resolved the related issue of whether Proposition
4, the enactment limiting state and local government appropriations and spending, applied to special
assessments. 113 Cal. App. 3d 443, 170 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1980). See CAL. CONST. art. XIB §§ 1-12
(West Supp. 199 1), for full text of Proposition 4. The Court of Appeal for the Third District held that
the spending limitation of Article XIIB did not apply to proceeds derived from special assessments.
Corin, 113 Cal. App. at 449, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
141. Malrstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 981-82, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 781-82.
142. Idt at 980-81, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 780-81.
143. Id. at 983-85, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 782-83. Accord, Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard,
114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981). In Trent, the Second District Court of Appeal
agreed with the Fifth District's conclusion in Malmstrom that Proposition 13 did not affect special
assessments because they were not taxes, special or otherwise. Id at 323, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
Because Proposition 13 was inapplicable to special assessments, the Second District rejected the
plaintiff's argument that Malmstrom deftied the term "special tax" as used in section 4 of the
amendment and refused to render any definition of "'special taxes" in the case. Id at 323, 328, 170
Cal. Rptr. at 688, 691.
144. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
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improvement projects financed previously with general taxes may
now be financed with special assessments.'45
Proposition 13 was further limited by the Second District Court
of Appeal in Solvang Municipal Improvement District v. Board of
Supervisors of the County of Santa Barbara.'46 In Solvang, the
plaintiff, a special district, created a parking district prior to
Proposition 13 which was financed by non-voted special
assessments against the benefitted property.'47 The Santa Barbara
Board of Supervisors refused to collect the assessments after
Proposition 13, contending that the assessments were
unconstitutional under the amendment's one percent limit on ad
valorem taxes. 4 ' The court upheld the validity of special
assessments, despite the fact that the assessments were measured
by the assessed value of benefitted parcels.'49 Following the
rationale of the Malmstrom decision, the Solvang court held that
the one percent limit of section 1 did not apply to any special
assessment, even if assessed on an ad valorem basis. 50 Hence,
special assessments may be levied according to the assessed value
of property, but they do not constitute an ad valorem property
tax.1
5 1
Despite mild language to the contrary,'52 the favorable
decisions in Malmstrom and Solvang seemingly invited a switch by
local governments from property taxes to special assessments for
projects traditionally financed with general revenues, and California
145. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 50078-50078.20 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (statutes
authorizing local governments to impose police and fire special assessments); k §§ 53970-53979
(West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (statutes authorizing local governments to impose police and fire
protection special taxes). See generally BenefirAssessments: A Born Again Revenue Raiser, CAL-TAX
RESEARCH BULL. 1-8 (1981) (reporting on new enabling legislation for special assessments and
increased use of special assessments after Maimstrom).
146. 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1980).
147. Id at 548, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
148. kId
149. Il at 548, 557, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 393, 398.
150. Id at 557, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 398. Special assessments may be levied on a variety of bases,
including fixed and variable, as well as ad valorem. IL
151. Il
152. See, e.g., id at 557, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 398 ("levies to meet general expenses of the taxing
entity and to construct facilities to serve the general public... may not be transformed from general
ad valorem taxes to special assessments by a mere change in the name of the levy").
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courts have allowed municipalities to make thisswitch.153 For
example, in J. W. Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego,154 the city
created a system of "facility benefit assessments" (FBA) which
were exacted from developers who applied for building permits to
develop land in one of the city's new communities.155 Under this
scheme, proceeds of the FBA were collected in a special fund for
exclusive use in constructing "a broad spectrum of public works"
including parks, transit and transportation, libraries, fire stations,
school buildings, and police stations for the benefit of the assessed
parcels. 156 The plaintiff, a landowner and developer, challenged
the assessment system, arguing that the FBA did not directly
benefit the assessed property and were thus special taxes under
section 4 of Proposition 13,157 and that undeveloped and
developed parcels were treated differently. 158 The Court of
Appeal for the Fourth District upheld the city's financing scheme,
stating that the FBA did not constitute special taxes and thus were
not subject to the supermajority vote requirement of section 4 of
Proposition 13, and that the system of assessing and placing liens
on undeveloped properties only did not violate equal protection of
the law.
159
The J. W. Jones court acknowledged that San Diego's
assessments did not fit within the traditional definition of special
153. Henke, supra note 9, at 283-85.
154. 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984).
155. Md. at 749-50, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83. In the early 1960's, San Diego had created a
general plan to develop land in "planned urbanizing areas," which included developing and new
communities. Ma. at 749-50, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 582. The J. W. Jones decision concerned the planned
urbanizing area of North University City. Ma. at 749, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 582. To finance the
construction of public facilities within North University City, San Diego enacted an ordinance which
authorized the city council to designate lands to be benefitted by public improvements and apportion
the costs of the improvements among the parcels. Ia. The ordinance conditioned the issuance of
building permits upon the payment of "facility benefit assessments," and gave the city a lien on the
benefitted parcels until the FBA were paid. Md.
156. Id. at 749, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
157. Id. at 756, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 588. Jones contended that some of the public facilities
financed by the assessments were remote and therefore only indirectly benefitted the assessed parcels.
Id.
158. Id at 756-57, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89. Jones argued that only owners of undeveloped
property were required to bear the burden of paying for public facilities while owners of both
undeveloped and developed properties derived benefit from the new facilities. Id
159. Id at 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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assessments because the facility benefit assessments imposed a lien
on parcels to pay for future improvements and because they were
assessed on a unique basis."6 However, the court stated that
these anomalies did not prevent the city's levies from being valid
special assessments rather than special taxes.'61 The court also
determined that the lien provision of the city's ordinance did not
create a discriminatory classification between undeveloped and
developed properties because the benefits to the developed
properties were only incidental. 62 As further justification for its
holdings, the court indicated that the facility benefit assessments
system was "necessary for the health and welfare of future
residents of" the city. 63 A companion case to JW. Jones, City
of San Diego v. Holodnak,'6 upheld a similar FBA system for a
wide variety of facilities and services' 65  under the same
rationale.'6 The court in J.W. Jones predicted the outcome of
160. let at 755, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 587. The J.W. Jones court stated that San Diego's ordinance
and assessments were "distant cousins" to traditional public work financing arrangements, since the
times for commencing and completing the public facilities were not fixed but rather were subject to
adjustment depending on growth needs and economic conditions. Iii The court noted that San
Diego's assessments were also unique in that they were apportioned amongst the parcels according
to the number of "net equivalent dwelling units" attributable to each parcel at its highest potential
development under current zoning, rather than on a front or square footage or ad valorem basis, as
are traditional assessments. I&a
161. IZL
162. Id. at 757, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 588. The court in J.W. Jones stated, "The levy on
undeveloped properties only has a reasonable basis. The incidental fallout of benefit to developed
parcels does not result in such equality as to offend equal protection concepts." Id
163. Id at 757-58, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89. The court found that the assessment system was
the key to implementing San Diego's controlled growth plan, without which future growth would be
jeopardized. Id The court also noted that the assessment scheme was reasonable and valid, stating
that "'narrow strictures of general law concepts of financing public utilities ... do not accommodate
the dynamics of explosive growth in sunbelt cities." Id. at 756, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
164. 157 Cal. App. 3d 759, 203 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1984).
165. The FBA system in Holodnak authorized San Diego to designate areas of benefit in the
city's new North City West community to be assessed for public improvements and to apportion
costs among according to benefit received. Id. at 761,203 Cal. Rptr. at 798. The public facilities to
be financed by the assessment system included water lines, community parks, a library, a park and
ride facility, a fire station, and widening of a bridge. Id.
166. Id at 762, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 799. The court adopted portions of the J.W. Jones opinion
as it addressed the contentions raised in Holodnak. Id. The court also made its own findings of
special benefit to North City West conferred by specific facilities financed by the FBA, and stated
that San Diego's determination of special benefit was both supported by the record and conclusive.
L at 762-63, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
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Holodnak and future cases by strongly hinting that it desired to
actively assist local governments to finance municipal growth. 6 7
Other cases have also extended the use of special assessments to
finance operating expenses of local government, such as
maintenance of flood control facilities 168  and road
maintenance. 9
The impact of these decisions has been to broaden the authority
of the California Legislature to enact several bills authorizing local
agencies to use special benefit assessments to augment their other
revenue sources. 7 General law cities requiring enabling statutes
in order to impose special assessments 7 ' have especially
benefitted from the courts' tolerance of the use of special
assessments since the California Legislature has interpreted relevant
decisions as validating legislative action. 72 Specifically, the state
legislature has authorized the use of special benefit assessments to
167. J.W. Jones, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589. Specifically, the J.W. Jones
court stated: "The vision of San Diego's future as sketched in the general plan is attainable only
through the comprehensive fmiancing scheme contemplated by the FBA. We view the precedents of
yesterday's case law, not as barriers to growth, but as the guidelines to accomplish the needs of
tomorrow." l The most questionable improvements financed by the FBA in Holodnak, the park and
ride facility and bridge widening, were easily approved by the court. Holodnak, 157 Cal. App. at 763,
203 Cal. Rptr. at 799. The court found benefit to the assessed properties conferred by the park and
ride facility, stating that the properties would benefit from a decrease in traffic and pollution, even
though the facility was open to everyone. IM Likewise, the court found that the assessed properties
would be benefitted by widening of a bridge spanning the city's major interstate highway since.
ingress and egress to the new development would be expanded. I&a
168. See American River Flood Control Dist. v. Sayre, 136 Cal. App. 3d 342, 356, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 202, 207 (1982) (special assessment for operating and maintenance costs of flood control
district held valid).
169. See City Council of the City of San Jose v. South, 146 Cal. App. 3d 320, 332 335, 194
Cal. Rptr. 110, 118, 120 (1983) (special assessment for maintenance of landscaped median islands
and their appurtenant areas held valid).
170. ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at 251.
171. Local general law governments may impose special assessments only if specifically
authorized by the state legislature. ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at 247. See supra
note 3 (discussing the legal structure of local government in California).
172. ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at 251; Benefit Assessments: A Born Again
Revenue Raiser, CAL-TAX RESEARCH BULL. 1-8 (1981).
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finance fire and police protection services, 173 flood control,1 74
drainage and water management services, 175 and street lighting
services.
171
While the expanded use of special benefit assessments can be
attributed to a willingness on the part of California courts to limit
the application of Proposition 13, that is only a partial explanation.
Another factor which accounts for the favorable judicial response
is that the formation of special assessment districts is not subject
to broad judicial review. 177 Although a special assessment must
particularly benefit the assessed property,178  courts give great
deference to a local governing body's finding of benefit because
the creation of an assessment district is an exercise of a
municipality's sovereign taxing power.179 Thus, so long as some
special benefit to the assessed property can be demonstrated, the
courts will probably uphold a local government's formation of a
special assessment district.' 0
173. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 50078-50078.20 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (statutes
authorizing local governments to impose police and fire special assessments).
174. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54710.5 (West Supp. 1991) (statute authorizing local
governments to impose assessments for flood control services).
175. See id. (statute authorizing local governments to impose assessments for drainage and
water management services).
176. See CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 18165 (West Supp. 1991) (statute authorizing cities to
impose assessments for street lighting).
177. See Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 16 Cal. 3d 676,684,547 P.2d 1377, 1382, 129
Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1976) (stating that "the scope of judicial review of such actions is quite narrow
.. "). In Dawson, the supreme court indicated that the local rulemaking body "is the ultimate
authority which is empowered to finally determine what lands are benefitted and what amount of
benefits shall be assessed against the several parcels benefitted.... [Special assessments are] of a
particularly legislative character, and the appropriate scope of review is firmly rooted in that
consideration." I at 684-85, 547 P.2d at 1382, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
178. See supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text (defining "'special assessment").
179. See, e.g., White v. County of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 897,904,608 P.2d 728,731, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 640, 644 (1980). In White, the supreme court stated that a special assessment will not be set
aside unless the "'absence of benefit clearly appears from the record," and that the local
government's "determination of benefit is conclusive." Ra See supra notes 127-130 and
accompanying text (discussing homerule taxing authority of counties and cities and legislative
enactments authorizing the imposition of special assessments and the formation of assessments
districts).
180. But see Harrison v. Board of Supervisors, 44 Cal. App. 3d 852, 858, 118 Cal. Rptr. 828,
831-32 (1975) (property not benefitted from storm sewers). Cf. City of Sacramento v. Drew, 207 Cal.
App. 3d 1287, 1294, 255 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1989) (public schools were not "of a local nature"
within the meaning of the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913).
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B. Governmental Regulatory and Service Fees
Local governments collect a multitude of fees for everything
from building permits to garbage services to dog licenses."'1 The
authority to collect such fees is derived from the state constitution
or a specific legislative enactment.182 Technically, governmental
fees are not taxes, so long as they do not exceed the value of the
benefit conferred or the service rendered. 3 These fees also are
not assessed upon the value of property.' Thus, Proposition 13
seemingly does not affect the power of municipalities to raise
revenues through use of such fees.185 However, because of the
increased interest in nontaxing alternatives after Proposition 13 was
enacted, 86 California courts have considered the application of
the amendment's provisions to a variety of governmental fees. 7
181. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON GOV'T REFORM, FINAL REPORT 118 (Jan. 1979)
(listing numerous new or increased county license, permit, and service fees in the year following the
approval of Proposition 13).
182. ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at 250.
183. See Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656,660, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674,678 (1980)
("In narrower contexts, the word [tax] has been construed to exclude charges to particular individuals
which do not exceed the value of the governmental benefit conferred upon or the services rendered
to the individuals ...").
184. Ordinarily, governmental fees are levied upon individuals and business entities. See
generally, Bauman & Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American
Practices, 50 L. CONTM. PROB. 51 (1987), for a thorough discussion of governmental fees and the
issues raised by use of such fees.
185. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA §§ 1-6 (West Supp. 1991) (using the term "tax" rather than
another descriptive term, such as "'levy," "charge," or "fee").
1'6. User fees have increased from $2,817 million in fiscal year 1971-72 to $11,135 million
in fiscal year 1982-83, an increase of 295 percent. ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at
252. In fiscal year 1982-83, user fees accounted for almost 41% of all city revenues and 19% of all
county revenues. Il at 256.
187. See, e.g., Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 221 Cal. App. 3d 198,205-06,
272 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24 (1990) (airport access fee upheld); Bixel Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles, 216
Cal. App. 3d 1208, 1220,265 Cal. Rptr. 347, 355 (1989) (fire hydrant fee struck down); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution Control Dist., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1135,250
Cal. Rptr. 420, 421 (1988) (pollution permit fee upheld); Beaumont Investors V. Beaumont-Cherry
Valley Water Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d 227, 238, 211 Cal. Rptr. 567, 573 (1985) (water connection
fee struck down); Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 325, 170 Cal. Rptr.
685, 689 (1981) (school impact fee upheld); Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 663,
166 Cal. Rptr. 674, 678 (1980) (new and increased fees for county services upheld).
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There are two typical legal issues involved in challenges to the
imposition of governmental fees. 8' The first is whether the fee
is authorized by state law."8 9 Without specific enabling or
constitutional authority, the fee will be struck down.1 9 The
second issue is whether the fee is really a tax.191 A local
government's authority to impose fees derives from the its police
power to regulate municipal activities for the public's health,
safety, or general welfare,1" while the taxing authority of local
governments is restricted to the express purpose of raising general
revenue.1 Legislation implementing Proposition 13 expressly
excludes from the definition of "special tax" any fee which does
not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the regulatory activity
or service for which the fee is charged and which is not levied for
general revenue purposes."' Thus, a fee which is not reasonably
equivalent to the cost of the regulatory activity or service, or which
is deposited into the general treasury rather than a special fund may
be deemed a tax and therefore prohibited by Proposition 13.'9'
California courts have reached varying conclusions regarding
the use of governmental fees to generate nontaxing alternative
sources of revenue.196 The Third District Court of Appeal
expressed the generally accepted rule regarding the validity of
regulatory fees under Proposition 13 in Mills v. County of
Trinity.97 In Mills, the plaintiff challenged a county resolution




192. See CAL. CONST. arL XI § 7 (West Supp. 1991) (homerule taxing authority provision for
counties and cities).
193. Bauman & Ethier, supra note 184, at 54.
194. CAL GOv'T CODE §§ 50075-50076 (West Supp. 1991). See Beaumont Investors v.
Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water Dist., 165 Cal. App. 227, 234, 211 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (1985)
(discussing sections 50075 and 50076 of the Government Code).
195. Bauman & Mthier, supra note 184, at 54.
196. See supra note 187, for a list of cases involving the use of governmental regulatory and
service fees.
197. 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1980). The issue of whether Proposition 4, the
enactment limiting government appropriations and spending, applied to governmental fees was
discussed in Trend Homes, Inc. v. Central Unified School District, 220 Cal. App. 3d 102, 269 Cal.
Rptr. 349 (1990). See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB §§ 1-12 (West Supp. 1991), for the full text of
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providing both increased and new fees for processing land use
applications198 as prohibited by the special tax provision of
Proposition 13.1" The court upheld the resolution, concluding
that land use regulatory fees do not constitute special taxes under
section 4, when the fees charged to particular applicants do not
exceed the reasonable cost of the regulatory activities.2" The
court refused to give an expansive reading of the term "tax" as
used in Proposition 13's special tax provision,"' indicating that
state voters did not intend to put local governments in a "fiscal
straitjacket. "2°2
A different analysis was utilized by the Court of Appeal for the
Second District in Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard."3 The
court upheld an ordinance requiring developers to either pay fees
or dedicate land to local school districts as a precondition to
issuance of a building permit. °4  The plaintiff, a subdivider,
claimed the ordinance was unconstitutional because the
development requirements constituted special taxes under section
Proposition 13. In Trend Homes, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that if a fee is not a special
tax within the meaning of Article XIILA, Proposition 4 is not applicable. Id at 115, 269 Cal. Rptr.
at 356.
198. Mills, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 658, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
199. Id. at 658-59, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 675. See CAt. CoNsT. art. XIIIA § 4 (West Supp. 1991)
(provision restricting the imposition of special taxes).
200. Id at 663, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 678. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors,
221 Cal. App. 3d 198, 208, 272 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25 (1990) (stating that governmental regulatory fees
should be comprised of a "fair and reasonable" approximation of the overall benefit derived from
the activity being regulated).
201. The Mills court utilized the rules of construction used to interpret constitutional provisions
expressed in Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dirt v. State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 244-45, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258 (1978), which requires the court to
interpret enactments so as to give full effect to the framers' objectives. Mills, 108 Cal. App. 3d at
659, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
202. Id. at 660, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 676. The trial court in Mills had construed the term "tax"
broadly to include "all charges, however labeled, which are to exact money for the support of
government or for public purposes." Id The court of appeal rejected this construction since such an
interpretation would render a county powerless to raise charges for proprietary functions. Id The
court reasoned that such a "draconian result" was probably never intended by the electorate. Id
203. 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr, 685 (1981).
204. Id at 321, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
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4 of Proposition 13.205 The court held that the restrictions of
Proposition 13 did not apply to the development fee and dedication
requirements. 2' First, the court stated that the development
requirements did not constitute ad valorem taxes because they were
not assessed according to property values.20 7 Second, because the
court determined that the ordinance was an appropriate exercise of
police power, to relieve conditions of overcrowding of local school
facilities caused by new development,0 8 the court stated that it
was unnecessary to decide whether the ordinance requirements
constituted a special tax."
The Second District Court of Appeal, however, later decided a
case on the "special tax" definition issue in California Building
Industry Association v. Government Board of the Newhall School
District of Los Angeles County.210 In this case, defendant school
districts levied taxes under the special tax provision of Proposition
13, after the resolution authorizing the taxes received the requisite
two-thirds voter majority approval.211 Plaintiff builders challenged
the taxes, contending that the levies were actually "development
fees" subject to statutory monetary limits. 21 2 The court adopted
the definition of "special taxes" expressed in City and County of
San Francisco v. Farrell,2 3 and held that the school district's
levies did not fall within the Farrell meaning.214 The court
concluded that the levies were more like development fees and
205. Id. at 321, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 687. The ordinance had been enacted by the City of Oxnard
without voter approval, and the plaintiff claimed that it thus violated the two-thirds voter majority
approval requirement of section 4.
206. X, at 328, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
207. Id. at 325, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 689. The Trent court reasoned that the development
requirements imposed by the city were not ad valorem taxes because the requirements were "not
imposed upon the land in the subdivision as such but [are] imposed on the privilege of subdividing
land.- Id.
208. 1, at 325-28, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 698-91.
209. IM at 325-28, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 689-91.
210. 206 Cal. App. 3d 212, 253 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1988).
211. 1& at 220, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
212. Id at 226, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
213. City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 57, 648 P.2d 935, 940, 184
Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1982). See supra notes 102-113 and accompanying text (discussing the Farrell
decision).
214. California Bldg., 206 Cal. App. 3d at 235, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 510-11.
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should be considered as such.215 Thus, the court invalidated the
fees because they exceeded statutory monetary limits."'
In Beaumont Investors v. Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water
District,217  the Fourth District Court of Appeal considered
whether a facilities fee enacted by a water district constituted a
special tax under Proposition 13.2 8 The court held that the fee
fell under the ambit of section 4 since the fee exceeded the
reasonable cost of constructing the water system.2 9 The fee was
therefore invalid since it had not been approved by a two-thirds
vote of the district's qualified voters." ° In support of its
conclusion, the court stated that the purpose of Proposition 13 was
to impose a "broad constitutional restriction" on the power of
local agencies to impose special taxes 221 Thus, any agency which
sought to avoid the special tax limitations of section 4 through use
215. /, at 237,253 Cal. Rptr. at 511. To support its conclusion that the school district's levies
constituted development fees rather than special taxes, the court in California Bldg. stated that
development fees are distinguishable from taxes because fees are voluntary, whereas taxes are
compulsory. Id at 236, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 510. The court also noted that development fees, unlike
.'special taxes" under section 4, are not intended to replace lost property tax revenues. Le at 236,
253 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
216. Id at 233, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 509. The defendants were required to comply with the
financial limitations of California Government Code sections 53080 and 65995 because school
districts have no independent taxing authority under the California Constitution. ML The school
districts' authority to impose development fees derived solely from legislative enactments since, as
the court held, section 4 of Proposition 13 was not a self-executing grant of taxing authority. Ad at
226-33, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 504-08.
217. 165 Cal. App. 3d 227, 211 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1985).
218. Id at 230, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 568. In Beaumont, defendant water district charged the
plaintiff developer a $750 per unit facilities fee to help pay for the construction of new water systems
facilities necessitated by development. Id at 231, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 568. The developer then brought
suit, contending that the fee fell within the purview of section 4 of Proposition 13, which requires
a two-thirds majority vote approval before a new special tax may be imposed. Id at 232, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 569.
219. I at 238, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 573. The court in Beaumont explained that in order for a
governmental fee to be exempt from Proposition 13, the fee must reasonably relate to the cost of the
service for which it is imposed. I at 234, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 570. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 50075-
50076 (West Supp. 1991) (authorizing cities, counties, and special districts to impose special taxes
and specifically excluding from the definition of "special tax" any fee "which does not exceed the
reasonable cost of providing the service or regulatory activity for which the fee is charged and which
is not levied for general revenue purposes").
220. Beaumont, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 238, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
221. I at 235,211 Cal. Rptr. at 571 (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist.
v. State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 259
(1978)).
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of "facilities fees" must bear the burden of proving that the
assessment does not amount to a "special tax," a task the water
district could not accomplish.222
The Fourth District Court of Appeal elaborated on the showing
necessary to prove that a regulatory fee was not a special tax in
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego City Air Pollution
Control District. 3 The court stated that the local taxing agency
should prove the estimated costs of the regulatory activity or
service and the basis for determining the manner in which the costs
are apportioned, so that the charges bear a reasonable relationship
to the benefits from the regulatory activity.224 Once the requisite
showing is made, a regulatory fee may be upheld.' The court
further noted that the imposition of fees was a reasonable way to
achieve Proposition 13's goals of effective property tax relief, since
the fees shifted the burden of costs from the taxpaying public to
those who directly benefit from conducting the regulatory
activity.2
26
The courts have been fairly strict in requiring a documented
showing that a regulatory fee is not a special tax. For example, in
Bixel Associates v. City of Los Angeles,227 the Court of Appeal
for the Second District struck down Los Angeles' development fee
because the city had not met its burden of showing that a valid
222. Beaumont, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 235-38,211 Cal. Rptr. at 571-73. The court distinguished
a factually similar special assessment case, J.W. Jones Cos. v. Holodnak, 157 Cal. App. 3d 745,403
Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984), stating that in J.W. Jones the City of San Diego had worked up a detailed and
sophisticated study and plan before imposing development charges, whereas the Beaumont Water
District had not made an informed decision. Id at 236-38, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 271-73.
223. 203 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 250 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1988). SDG & E involved a challenge to a
county air pollution control district's method of apportioning costs of permit programs among
agencies required to obtain operating permits. Id. at 1135, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 421. The court held that
the district could properly recover actual costs of operation by apportioning them among all
monitored polluting agencies based on an emissions fee schedule. I& at 1148-49, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
430-31.
224. Id at 1146, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
225. 1&d at 1147-48, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
226. I& at 1148-49, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
227. 216 Cal. App. 3d 1208, 265 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1989). Bixel involved an ordinance which
specified that fees collected from developers were to be deposited into a "Fire Hydrant Installation
and Main Replacement Fund" to finance the cost of initial installation and upgrades of fire hydrants
and the improvements or replacements of existing water mains. I&. at 1214, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
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method had been used for determining that the fees charged
reasonably reflected the burden posed by the development.228 The
Bixel court refused to hear policy arguments supporting the city's
decision to impose a fire hydrant fee, pointedly stating that the case
was not about "the obvious need for the funding by the City of
sophisticated fire protection in the post-Proposition 13 era" but
only about determining the constitutionality of the fee.22 9
Thus far, the California Supreme Court has not clarified the
scope of Proposition 13 with regard to governmental regulatory and
service fees. 23' The existing cases indicate that the courts have
been somewhat less tolerant of the use of governmental fees than
of special benefit assessments.231 One reason for the courts'
stricter approach may be the fact that the wide range of
governmental fees requires closer scrutiny than the narrow class of
levies constituting special assessments. However, the cases also
indicate that the courts have been less consistent in their analysis
of such fees under Proposition 13.232 These differing decisions
are to be expected in the absence of firm guidance by the supreme
court, but the cases also reflect the courts' differing views of
Proposition 13.233 The courts' uncertainty can best be explained
228. Id at 1219-20, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
229. Id at 1220, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
230. In Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. 3d 839,750 P.2d
324,244 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988), the supreme court did address a related issue. In Russ Bldg., plaintiff
developers challenged the retroactive application of a transit fee ordinance to new office buildings.
Id at 845, 750 P.2d at 326, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 685. The court held that the fee did not impair the
developers' vested rights, even though the developers had been issued building permits, had begun
construction, and had made a substantial fimancial commitment to their projects almost two years
before the ordinance was enacted. Id at 846, 750 P.2d at 327, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
231. See supra notes 196-233 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions reaching
differing conclusions as to the validity of certain governmental fees after Proposition 13).
232. See supra notes 196-233 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions reaching
differing conclusions based on differing rationales).
233. Compare Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 660, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674, 676
(3d Dist. 1980) (court chose to interpret special tax provision of Proposition 13 narrowly and upheld
regulatory fees, stating that Proposition 13 was not intended to put local governments in a "'iscal
straitjacket") with Bixel Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1208, 1220,265 Cal. Rptr.
347, 355 (2d Dist. 1988) (court struck down development fees and refused to hear policy arguments
in support thereof, stating that the case was not about the "obvious need for the funding by [Los
Angeles] of sophisticated fire protection in the post-Proposition 13 era").
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by a brief consideration of the current status and future of
Proposition 13 and a summary of the California courts' role in
shaping the amendment, discussed below.
IV. PROPOSITION 13 TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE
After surviving an initial challenge to its constitutionality"
and several severe tests thereafter, 5 Proposition 13 is still not
safe from attack 236 In 1989, the Supreme Court of the United
States in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission
2 37
struck down a West Virginia taxing scheme similar to Proposition
13 as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.28  In Allegheny, the plaintiffs, various coal
companies, challenged the Webster County assessor's method of
property value appraisal," 9 contending that the method of
appraisal resulted in recently sold properties having higher
appraised values than properties that had not recently been
sold.2' The Supreme Court of the United States accepted the coal
companies' argument that the method of appraisal created an
unconstitutional discriminatory classification between new
purchasers and existing landowners.24 The Court reasoned that
using the selling price of property to fix assessments was not
rationally related to the county's objective of establishing accurate,
current property values, since this method resulted in dramatic and
234. See Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 219, 249, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241, 259 (1978) (upholding the
validity of Proposition 13).
235. See supra notes 64-119 and accompanying text (discussing relevant Proposition 13 court
decisions).
236. See generally Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 GEO. WASH. L RuV. 261,293
(1989) (discussing the constitutionality of Proposition 13 after the Supreme Court of the United
States' decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989)).
237. 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989).
238. Id at 637.
239. In Webster County, an appraisal of value was made each time property ownership
changed. Id. at 635. The appraisal value was the sales price of property, determined by the declared
consideration in the deed to the property. Id.
240. Id. at 635-37.
241. Id. at 637.
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unequal differences in valuation of comparable properties.24 2
While the Court did not state that all assessment schemes which
use more than one method of assessing property in the same class
are invalid, the Court indicated that such schemes must ensure that
general adjustments of comparable property are "accurate enough
over a short period of time to equalize the differences in proportion
between the assessments of a class of property holders." 24 3
Because the Webster County assessor's adjustments were neither
prompt nor substantial enough to eliminate the disparity in
appraisals of comparable properties, the county's assessment
scheme was struck down.2'
The Allegheny decision left open the question of the
constitutionality of Proposition 13, since the Court declined to
decide whether the Webster County assessment scheme might be
constitutional if it were the law of a state rather than a single
county." Whether the Court was indicating its approval of
Proposition 13 or inviting a challenge to the amendment is
arguable.246 Numerous renewed challenges to the constitutionality
of Proposition 13 have been filed since Allegheny,247 however,
several California courts of appeal have affirmed the validity of the
amendment.24
242. IdL at 637-39.
243. Id at 638.
244. Id at 638-39.
245. Id. at 638 n.4. Specifically, the Court stated:
We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster County assessment method would
stand on a different footing if it were the law of a State, generally applied, instead of the
aberrational enforcement policy it appears to be. [Proposition 13] is grounded on the belief that
taxes should be based on the original cost of property and should not tax unrealized paper gains
in the value of the property.
Id See Glennon, supra note 236, at 301 (discussing the probability of success of an equal protection
challenge to Proposition 13 and stating that a court could distinguish Allegheny if California
government authorities came forward with a legitimate state interest justifying its policy of appraisal).
246. Glennon, supra note 236, at 294.
247. See ASSEMBLY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-33 (discussing challenges to
Proposition 13 filed after the decision in Allegheny).
248. See, e.g., City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Mackzum, 279 Cal. Rptr. 220 (CL App. 4th Dist.
Mar. 20, 1991) (No. E007876) (claim that legislation implementing Proposition 13 violates equal
protection of the laws struck down); R.H. Macy Co. v. Contra Costa County, 226 Cal. App. 3d 352,
357, 370, 276 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533, 541 (1991) (claim that change in ownership provision of
Proposition 13 violates the equal protection, right to travel, and interstate commerce clauses of the
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While the ultimate validity of Proposition 13 is unclear after the
Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Allegheny, local
taxing jurisdictions in the meantime will have to continue finding
adequate financing for local government activities. California courts
have taken an active role in moderating the harsh fiscal impact of
Proposition 13 by limiting the application of the amendment's key
provisions.249 Because Proposition 13 was ambiguous in a
number of particulars,' 0 the courts have had ample opportunity
to give an expansive reading to the amendment, yet for the most
part cases have been decided in favor of greater freedom by local
governments to impose assessments." This response by the
courts cannot be unintended. The Proposition 13 court decisions
reflect a conscious desire on the part of California courts to make
Proposition 13 an effective scheme of property tax relief, but
without crippling the ability of local governments to carry out
municipal functions. 2 As a result of the courts' actions in
shaping Proposition 13, some local governments' budgets have not
suffered as dramatically as the authors of the amendment might
have anticipated. 3
United States Constitution struck down); Nordlinger v. Lynch, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 1265, 1282,
275 Cal. Rptr. 684, 686, 698 (1991) (claim that acquisition value assessment method of Proposition
13 is unconstitutional after the Allegheny decision struck down).
249. See supra notes 64-119 and accompanying text (discussing relevant Proposition 13 court
decisions).
250. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d
208, 245, 583 P.2d 1281, 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 257 (1978).
251. See Kroll, supra note 9, at 29.
252. See id. at 29-31 (describing the loopholes of Proposition 13 and the ability of local
governments to find ways around the amendment's tax limitations).
253. Id. at 29. Because the courts have narrowly interpreted all disputed sections of the
measure, the impact of Proposition 13 on local governments is much less severe than expected. let
The response of the courts led Proposition 13 co-author Howard Jarvis to state, "The court doesn't
know what a tax is." I&a
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CONCLUSION
California courts have tempered the effect of the taxing
restrictions of Proposition 13 by allowing local governments to
develop nontaxing sources of revenue. 4 The most effective
source of nontaxing revenue is special benefit assessments. The
courts have shown great tolerance for allowing special assessments
to finance an expanded variety of municipal improvements and
services." To a lesser extent, the courts have also allowed the
use of governmental regulatory and service fees. 6 While the
validity of the use of these fees is not as predictable as the use of
special assessments, governmental fees remain a viable source of
nontaxing revenues, as evidence by the sheer number of these
fees. 25
7
While most local governments still regard Proposition 13 as a
"dirty word,"258 California courts have kept the amendment from
becoming a "fiscal straitjacket ' " 9 to local governments.2' By
taking an active role in shaping the provisions and application of
Proposition 13, the courts have ensured that local taxing
jurisdictions can find alternative sources of revenue despite the
severe loss of property tax funds.
Julie K. Koyama
254. See supra notes 120-233 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions impacting the
use and effectiveness of nontaxing sources of revenue).
255. See supra notes 120-180 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of court decisions
broadening the use of special assessments).
256. See supra notes 181-233 and accompanying text (discussing the use and effectiveness of
governmental fees to generate revenues).
257. See generally Bauman & Ethier, supra note 184, for a complete analysis of the use of
governmental fees on geographical and purpose bases.
258. Kroll, supra note 9, at 28.
259. Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 660, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674, 676 (1980).
260. See supra notes 250-253 and accompanying text (describing the role of California courts
in shaping Proposition 13).
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